刘奎甫,茅宁

• 1:南京大学 商学院，江苏 南京 210093

摘要(Abstract)：

“僵尸企业”通常是指那些陷入财务危机但依靠债权人的帮助依然维持生存的企业。当前，我国“僵尸企业”问题日益突出并产生严重后果。2000年之后，国际学术界关于“僵尸企业”的研究开始涌现，而国内关于“僵尸企业”的学术研究则非常稀缺。因此，本文全面回顾了国外有关“僵尸企业”研究的进展，对“僵尸企业”的内涵界定、识别方法、形成原因、影响效应等相关问题进行了梳理。综述发现：对“僵尸企业”的界定需要满足“陷入财务危机”和“债权人继续提供借贷”两个标准；银行掩盖不良贷款问题的动机是“僵尸企业”形成的重要原因；“僵尸企业”会阻碍行业生产率的提高和经济增长。本文对于国内学者把握“僵尸企业”研究的脉络和未来的研究方向、增进对“僵尸企业”的认识和寻找相应的解决方案具有一定的借鉴意义。

关键词(KeyWords)： 僵尸企业;银行坏账;资本注入;财务困境

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目（71372031）

作者(Author): 刘奎甫,茅宁

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.10.001

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