汪崇金1,2,聂左玲3

• 1:1.山东财经大学 财政税务学院，山东 济南 250014；2.中国社会科学院 财经战略研究院，北京 100028；3.山东财经大学 金融学院，山东 济南 250014

摘要(Abstract)：

大量的公共品实验显示，即使无外在权威干预，强互惠行为也能够维系公共品自愿供给合作，这为理解“人类社会合作何以可能”之谜开启了一扇窗。然而，破解社会合作难题，强互惠行为真的够强吗？近年来，学术界就此不断提出诸多质疑，例如社会偏好是否稳定可靠、私人惩罚能否足够有效、利他惩罚是否存在现实证据等，都对强互惠理论形成巨大的挑战。文章围绕公共品实验研究，回顾了学术界对这些质疑的积极探索，总结了强互惠理论研究的新进展，并对强互惠理论及其价值进行了评述。

关键词(KeyWords)： 强互惠理论；社会偏好稳定性；反社会惩罚；生态有效性；外部有效性

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation):

作者(Author): 汪崇金1,2,聂左玲3

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