朱建安,陈凌,吴炳德

• 1:浙江大学城市学院
• 2:浙江大学企业家学院
• 3:浙江大学管理学院
• 4:福州大学经济与管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

年老的一代创业者将经营权让渡给家族成员还是职业经理人,是控股家族的重要战略决策。虽然有众多经验研究显示聘家族CEO不利于企业绩效,但现实经济中有较多公司即便是上市公司仍然雇用家族成员做CEO。为解释这种看似"无效率"的聘任安排,本文将民营企业管理职业化问题置于代际传承的背景下,将关注焦点从营利性的企业拓展到其背后的家族,从控股家族的异质性目标探索企业聘任决策的前因变量。借助多任务委托代理模型,提出控股家族非经济目标驱动下公司与CEO的匹配框架,发现更加重视非经济目标的家族倾向于提供较低激励强度的薪酬合约,对高管的经验和能力要求较低,同时更加重视CEO的家族身份。该研究试图论证企业CEO的聘任决策内生于家族异质性目标,尝试填补家族的意愿和控制能力之间逻辑关系的理论性缺口。对家族企业聘任决策前因变量的分析,既深化了家族企业情境下的组织理论研究,也为一代创业者让渡经营权提供了决策建议。

关键词(KeyWords)： 家族企业;CEO聘任;异质性目标;意愿与能力;匹配

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目(71272172);; 浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY17G020012);; 浙江省社科规划重点项目(17NDJC031Z);; 福建省社科规划项目(FJ2015C113);; 福建省自然科学基金项目(2016J01335);; 浙江大学城市学院北秀青年学者项目

作者(Author): 朱建安,陈凌,吴炳德

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.12.001

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