李维安^1，2,齐鲁骏³

• 1:天津财经大学，天津 300222
• 2:南开大学 中国公司治理研究院，天津 300071
• 3:天津财经大学 商学院，天津 300222

摘要(Abstract)：

传统的公司治理研究建立在委托代理理论的经济人假设上，但治理主客体所嵌入的社会网络同样会对其自身决策行为施加影响。相较于以经济属性为中心的代理理论，关注行动者社会属性的社会网络理论为公司治理研究开辟了新的方向。基于内外治理机制的划分和现有研究的积累，本文首先对公司治理中存在的董事网络、投资者网络和利益相关者网络三种社会网络类型进行讨论，论述了社会网络构建的外部制度背景动因和内部资源依赖动因，并对网络的概念类型和联结多样性进行界定。其次，针对性地检索了国内外现有文献，运用CiteSpace进行科学计量分析和热点挖掘，发现相较于国外研究进展，我国公司治理中的社会网络研究还有较大的拓展空间。最后，在总结和比较现有研究成果的基础上，指出现有研究在思路、方法、内容等方面的趋势变化，为社会网络治理机制的未来研究提供建议和帮助。

关键词(KeyWords)： 公司治理;社会网络;科学计量学

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金重点项目（71533002）；教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划（IRT0926）；天津财经大学研究生科研资助计划（2015TCB11）

作者(Author): 李维安^1，2,齐鲁骏³

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.01.006

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