投资者法律保护与公司治理交互作用及其对公司绩效影响研究述评
张曦;周方召;
摘要(Abstract)：
传统的公司治理理论主要单一地研究公司治理机制对公司绩效的影响。作为一种公司外部治理机制,投资者法律保护能够与公司内部治理机制形成交互作用,从而可以更好地防范大股东等内部人侵占中小股东利益的行为,同时促进公司绩效的提升和资本市场的发展。本文沿着投资者法律保护与公司治理的交互作用及其对公司绩效的影响这条主线,分别从法律渊源、股权集中度、董事会监督、管理层薪酬激励和公司自主治理五个方面对国外近几年的相关研究进行了评述和分析,以供国内开展公司内、外部治理机制交互作用研究参考。
关键词(KeyWords)： 投资者法律保护;公司内部治理机制;交互作用;绩效
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社科基金项目《法律经济学原理与实证研究》(编号:03BJL007);; 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目《金融体系创新的演化博弈分析及相关影响研究》(编号:09YJC790062)
作者(Authors): 张曦;周方召;
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2010.09.007
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