周建;余耀东;罗肖依;

• 1:南开大学中国公司治理研究院
• 2:南开大学商学院
• 3:南开大学滨海学院

摘要(Abstract)：

公司高管行为及其引致的代理问题向来是公司治理研究的主题。传统代理理论因低度社会化导致经济学视角下的公司治理研究缺乏对公司高管社会行为的关注,公司治理社会学派通过研究社会互动和社会建构中的公司治理问题,衍生出社会情境代理和社会建构代理视角下的公司高管社会行为研究,进而推动公司治理研究从经济学视角向社会学视角的转换。本文基于社会情境代理和社会建构代理观点,阐述公司治理社会学派关于高管社会行为研究的现状,指出相关研究的不足,并做出未来研究展望,其中尤其强调以本土化和边界拓展为途径进行理论创新的可能性。本文为基于组织社会心理学视角的行为公司治理研究提供了有价值的思想启发和资料参考。

关键词(KeyWords)： 高管社会行为;社会情境代理;社会建构代理;行为公司治理

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272184);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71533002);; 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD630002)

作者(Authors): 周建;余耀东;罗肖依;

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.04.001

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